The rebirth of Cartesian philosophy 3

(The truth obtained by reconsidering René Descartes’ philosophy from a current perspective 3)

Part II

Diversity and uniqueness came about as a solution to skepticism

Bibliography quoted in the Second Part.

# Skepticism: The Origins of Early Modern Philosophy (Kinokuniya Shoten)

Richard Henry Popkin

Matao Noda, Akio Iwatsubo (Translator)

#Descartes Shimizu Shoin (Publisher)

Katsuhiko Ito

On Skepticism

This research is not about a series of doubts directed at traditional religious beliefs, but rather about skepticism as a philosophical view that has its origins in ancient Greek thought. The diverse skeptical reflections and skeptical attitudes of the early Greek thinkers were divided into two main schools during the Hellenistic period. One is the view of Academic Skepticism, which states that no knowledge is possible. The other is the view of Pyrrhonist Skepticism, which developed into a set of arguments proving the view that, as there is only inadequate evidence to determine whether or not some knowledge is possible, we must refrain from making any judgments on any issues concerning knowledge.

The term “Academia Skepticism” is derived from the fact that it was formulated in the third century BC at the Academy of Plato. It developed from the Socratic (c. 470 BC – 399 BC) reflection that “What I know is that I know nothing”. Above all, they developed a series of arguments to show that nothing can be known, in opposition to the cognitivist claims of the Stoic philosophers. I think that doubting is one of the wisest ways to proceed with an argument.

A categoricalist philosopher is one who asserts that they have ascertained some truth about the real nature of things. The aim of the Academy school of sceptical philosophers was to show, through a series of arguments and questions, that categoricalist philosophers could not be certain that they were perceiving things with absolute certainty. The Academicians formulated a series of difficulties that showed that the information we obtain through our senses cannot be relied on, that we cannot be sure that our reasoning is reliable, and that we do not have any guaranteed signs or criteria for determining which of our judgments are true and which are false.

The beginning of the Pyrrhonist movement was the legendary philosopher Pyrrho (c. 360-275 BC) from Elis in ancient Greece, and his pupil Timon of Phlius (c. 315-225 BC). The stories that are told about Pyrrho tell us that he was not a theorist, but a living example of a thoroughly skeptical person who never got involved in any judgment that went beyond what was apparent at the time. His main interest seems to have been ethical and moral. In this area he tried to avoid the misfortune that naturally arises from the acceptance of value theory and the judgments that result from it. If such a value theory is even slightly doubtful, then its acceptance and use will only cause mental anguish. Pyrrhonism, as a theoretically formulated form of skepticism, was founded by Aenesidemus (c. 100-40 BC). When the categoricalists say “something can be known” and the Academicians say “nothing can be known”, the Pyrrhonists thought that “both of them are categorical”.

From around the 2nd century BC to the time of Sextus Empiricus (2nd to 3rd century AD), the Pyrrhonist movement seems to have flourished mainly among the medical community around Alexandria as an antidote to the categoricalism of other medical communities, both positive and negative.

This position is still known today through the writings of Sextus Empiricus, author of “Outline of Pyrrhonist Philosophy”, and his magnum opus “Refutation of the Scholars”, which uses skepticism to destroy and demolish all kinds of laws, from logic and mathematics to astronomy and grammar.

These two schools of skepticism had little impact after the Hellenistic period. The Pyrrhonist view was almost unknown in the West until its rediscovery in the 16th century. The Academy view was mainly known and discussed through the writings of St. Aurelius Augustine (354-430). Even before the period we are about to discuss, there were signs of a skeptical mindset among anti-rational theologians, whether Jewish, Muslim or Christian. This theological movement reached its peak in the 15th century in the writings of Nicolaus Cusanus (1401-1464) in the West, and many skeptical arguments were used to overturn the conviction of religious awareness and a rational approach to religious truth.

The period we will be discussing, 1500-1650 AD, is not the only time when ancient skepticism had an impact on modern thought. We can also see the influence of ancient skeptics before and after this period.

Skepticism seems to have played a unique role in the period from the Reformation to the formulation of Descartes’ philosophy. This particular role is based on the fact that the intellectual crisis caused by the Reformation coincided with the rediscovery and revival of the arguments of the ancient Greek skeptics. In the 16th century, the rediscovery of a manuscript of the works of Sextus revived interest in ancient skepticism and the application of its views to contemporary problems.

We do not mean to downplay the other role that the views of ancient skepticism played in attracting the attention of thinkers in the 16th and 17th centuries. However, Sextus’ work seems to have played a particular and powerful role for many of the philosophers, theologians and scientists we are considering here. It is also thought that Sextus was the direct or indirect source of many of their arguments, concepts and theories. It is only in Sextus’s work that we find a complete introduction to the position of the Pyrrhonian Skeptics and all of the weapons of dialectic (dialectics) that they used to oppose so many philosophical arguments.

For this reason, thinkers such as Montaigne, Mersenne and Gassendi looked to Sextus for material to use in dealing with the issues of the day. I also think that this crisis is more appropriately described as a “Pyrrhonist crisis” than as an “Academian crisis”.

At the end of the 17th century, the great skeptic Pierre Bayle (1647-1706) thought that the reintroduction of the Sextus debate was the beginning of modern philosophy. Many writers of this period used the term “sceptic” as being the same as “Pyrrhonist”, and they often followed Sextus’s view that the Academic sceptics were not really sceptics, but negative categoricalists.

The history of skepticism we will consider here ends with the death of Descartes. The reason for this limitation is that it seems to me that skepticism played one role up to this point and another role after that.

The exact opposite of skepticism is categoricalism, the view that it is possible to present evidence to prove that a particular non-empirical proposition cannot be false in any way. Like the skeptic we are considering here, I also cast doubt on the categoricalist claim, and ultimately I think this claim is based more on faith than on evidence. If this is the case, then any categoricalist view will be more or less faith-based. If this is demonstrated, then the skeptic will be convinced of something and become a categoricalist.

The source of diversity is Herbert of Cherbury’s book “On Truth”

Neither Edward Herbert, 1st Baron Herbert of Cherbury (1583-1648) nor Jean de Silhon (1596-1667) fully recognized the depth to which the “new Pyrrhonism” had overturned the foundations of human cognition. However, they both knew that this problem had to be dealt with in a new way. The former proposed an elaborate method for discovering truth, and the latter tried to present some fundamental truths that could not be doubted. However, René Descartes, the greatest opponent of skepticism, realized that both of them were making a fatal mistake because they did not understand the fundamental point of contention. Silhon wrote the books “Two Truths” and “On the Immortality of the Soul”.
Herbert was the ambassador to France from 1618 to 1624, and it was there that he came into contact with the current of skepticism and the attempts to counter it. It was also during this time that he became acquainted with Mersenne, who is thought to have translated his book into French, and with Gassendi, to whom he gave a copy of his book.
After spending many years on this great work (which he began in 1617, before becoming ambassador to Paris), he was overcome with fear and trepidation about whether the book would be accepted by the world, but Herbert accepted what he thought was a message from on high, and finally published “On Truth” in 1624.
The book begins with a description of the miserable state of learning at the time, the confusion of beliefs, and the various disputes. There are people in the world who can perceive everything, and there are people who can perceive nothing. Herbert claimed that he did not belong to either of these schools of thought.
Or to be more precise, he thought that something could be recognized. What we need to recognize and evaluate our perceptions is a definition of truth, a sign of truth, and a method of discovering truth. When we discover all of these, we will no longer be able to remain skeptical, because we will understand that there are certain conditions that allow us to recognize objects with our abilities.

The first proposition of “On Truth” explicitly states that “Truth exists”. Herbert says that “the sole purpose of this proposition is to assert the existence of truth to the foolish and the skeptic”. In order to show his opposition to the ideas of the “new Pyrrhonists”, Herbert set out to show what truth is and how we can arrive at it. He says that there are four types of truth.

(1) The truth of things as they really are in themselves, (2) the truth of the appearances that things show to us, (3) the truth of the concepts we form about things, and (4) the common concepts that we judge by means of appearances and concepts, which are our subjective truths, or intellectual truths. These are mainly based on Aristotle’s analysis of the means of acquiring true perception. What is this treasure, the common concept? It is the truth of the intellect, a certain common concept that exists in all normal human beings, and these concepts are the building blocks of all things, derived from universal wisdom and imprinted on the soul by the dictates of nature itself.

The truth in (1) is absolute. It is “things as they are”, and this is what we seek to recognize using the other three conditional truths. These other three truths are related to the perceiver rather than the object itself. Our task is to discover a criterion or sign that determines whether our subjective information is in agreement with the truth of the object itself, starting from the information we have.

Here, I will show you the procedure for how truth is judged. What we perceive from appearances can deceive or mislead us as a guide to what the real object is. However, appearances are always true as appearances, and they appear as they appear. However, it is not necessarily an indication of the truth of the thing itself. The concepts we form based on our experiences are entirely our own, and these concepts may or may not correspond to the things they are supposed to be concepts about. If our sensory organs are imperfect, if they are inferior, if our minds are full of deceptive prejudices, then our concepts will be completely undermined. Therefore, the final truth, the truth of the intellect, determines whether our subjective faculties have sufficiently exercised their cognitive functions through their innate faculties and common concepts. It is by this standard or sign that we can determine whether there is a correspondence between the personal subjective truth of an appearance or concept and the truth of the thing. Therefore, we can determine whether we have objective knowledge.

Herbert then went on to explain in such a cumbersome way, step by step, the method for arriving at the subjective or conditional truth of each item, the method for ascertaining the common concepts or signs by which to judge whether the subjective truth coincides with the truth of things, and finally, the method for applying this whole mechanism to the search for truth. Because there are difficulties raised by skeptics at each stage, we must carefully state the conditions for confirming the truth of each item.

Thus, Herbert said, “In my view, universal consent must be considered the beginning and end of theology and philosophy. God has given us all of these truths through providence. Therefore, they are the only basis we have for gaining knowledge of the real world, and they are trustworthy.

Herbert’s proposal for dealing with skepticism was certainly widely accepted at the time as an antidote, but it was severely criticized by Gassendi and Descartes. Gassendi attacked Herbert’s proposal as categoricalism that failed to conquer the skeptics and was indefensible. Descartes also attacked Herbert’s proposal as incomplete categoricalism that failed to refute Pyrrhonism because it did not grasp the fundamental point of contention.

Gassendi’s criticism

Two documents have survived concerning Gassendi’s refutation. One is a polite letter that was never sent to Herbert, in which he raised several fundamental issues. The other is a letter to a mutual friend, Diodati, which contained harsh accusations. The latter was Gassendi’s true opinion of Herbert’s new philosophical system in response to the challenge of skepticism. It expressed the opinion that Herbert’s diagram was a confused labyrinth that led nowhere.
Gassendi said that the truth that Herbert claimed to have discovered was unrecognizable and unrecognizable. Even if we don’t know what truth is, we can see that Herbert failed to find it and did not respond to the skeptics. Even if we don’t have another categoricalism to replace Herbert’s scheme, we can understand that there is something wrong with Herbert’s scheme. His new system is just a kind of dialectic. However, I think it has such merits.

After this commentary, Gassendi tried to make Herbert’s entire effort come to naught, and he simply formulated the difficulties of skepticism as he saw them. According to Herbert’s diagram, the sign or standard of truth is natural instinct and our common sense. He says that this allows each of us to judge the true nature of things. If this is true, how can we explain the terrible disagreement in judgments that arises on almost every issue?
Everyone is convinced of their own natural instincts and inner abilities. If each person uses Herbert’s method of explaining this disagreement, each person will say that the other person is “not sound and complete”. And each person will believe it based on the truth of their own intellect, and they will get stuck in a dead end. Because each person will naturally think that he is right, and they appeal to the same internal standard. They have no sign to determine whose view is true. Who can be the judge in the first place, and who can prove that they have the right not to decide?
As long as there is disagreement on practically everything, the same difficult problem of skepticism that was raised at the time of the Reformation will also trouble Herbert’s philosophy. Each individual will be able to subjectively find the truth of things according to the standards within themselves. But when the opinions of different people do not match up and each person is convinced subjectively, who can judge the truth? Excepting the mentally handicapped and infants, Herbert claimed that there is universal agreement on certain fundamental matters. But then, if the opposing parties each claim to possess soundness, mental health, and mental maturity, who or what can be the judge of these qualities? Therefore, Herbert’s scheme has no ability to determine the truth of real essence, because it is based on changeable and weak criteria such as natural instinct and inner conviction, concluded Gassendi.

Descartes’s criticism

A different, and perhaps more biting, criticism of ‘On Truth’ was made by Descartes. Unlike Gassendi, he deeply sympathized with the book’s aim of refuting skepticism, and so he was even more aware of the fundamental fallacy of the book. In 1639, Mersenne sent a copy of Herbert’s book to Descartes, and received a detailed treatise on the book in response. “This book deals with a subject that I have been investigating all my life, but it takes a very different path from the one I have followed,” Descartes commented. The fundamental difference between Descartes’ work and Herbert’s work is that the former is a concept so clear that it is impossible not to know ‘truth’. Therefore, he claimed that he had no doubts or objections about truth. The latter was trying to discover what truth is.
As Descartes saw, the fundamental problem with Herbert’s research method is that if truth is not recognized in advance, there is no way to learn about truth at all. In order to accept his conclusion that the diagram in “On Truth” is a method for measuring or discovering truth, it is necessary to recognize what truth is in advance. The concept of truth is something that is recognized intuitively, as are some other fundamental concepts such as form, size, motion, position, and time. If we try to define them, we end up with ambiguity.
Herbert had many measuring devices for knowing the truth, but he could not know what they measured. Descartes started from the intuitive recognition of a single truth and constructed his truth measurement criteria. Descartes found cogito, a method of cognition for testing that “truth”. Herbert may have had a single “truth”, but he could not know whether it was the real truth.

Herbert’s new philosophy was a proposal about the truth of diversity

Gassendi saw that this new scheme could not discover the truth of things, and that it was practically a kind of skepticism, because there was no universal agreement on practically anything. Descartes saw that Herbert had started from the wrong place and had failed to propose sufficient signs for finding the truth. In order to overcome skepticism, we must recognize what is true. We must not seek truth through countless procedures whose relationship to the search for truth is not determined. And we must have a sign to recognize truth that does not confuse true and false or doubtful things. Herbert was unable to provide a sufficient answer to the Pyrrhonist crisis.

My opinion

From our perspective in the modern world, I think that skepticism contains a way of thinking that encourages diversity. When discussing the truth, categoricalism comes first, and then skepticism, which contains opposing ideas, appears. Skepticism expresses the idea that there is no single answer. I think it is good that discussions can be broadened, but sometimes it is difficult because the conclusions do not converge. Therefore, various ideas have been devised to avoid the crisis of skepticism, but no decisive solution has appeared. The Pyrrhonist Crisis refers to the fact that what was required of humans by the gods was not being achieved. Someone had to respond to the gods in some way and declare the results. This is where Herbert’s proposal came in. His new philosophy seems to be the prototype of what we would call “diversity” today. At the time, it seems to have been rejected by Gassendi and Descartes, but it could be said that skepticism died and was resurrected in the era of the scientific revolution, opening the door to diversity. In the modern era, the idea of diversity is one way of solving such problems. I think Herbert discovered one of the truths of diversity, discovering a new philosophical source.

The king of skepticism is Descartes

In a letter to Father Pierre Burdin (1595-1653), Descartes declared that he was the first person to have overcome the skepticism of the skeptics. More than 100 years later, one of his admirers said, “There were skeptics before Descartes, but they were just ordinary skeptics. However, Descartes mastered the method of deriving philosophical certainty from skepticism. At the time, there was little attention paid to Descartes’ intellectual reform movement from the perspective of the skeptical crisis. Descartes expressed a deep interest in skepticism of the time. He also showed that he was well-versed in the writings of the Pyrrhonists of ancient times and of his own time. He also developed his philosophy through his confrontation with the serious ‘Pyrrhonist crisis’ of 1628-1629. Descartes said that his philosophical system was the only intellectual fortress that could withstand the attacks of the skeptics.
It seems that he was well aware not only of the Pyrrhonist classics, but also of the growing danger of the skeptical trend of the time for learning and religion. In a letter to Father Bourdan, he wrote, “We must not think that the school of ancient skeptics has long since disappeared. It is still flourishing, and always has been. He wrote, “Most people who think they have some kind of ability that surpasses that of other people find nothing satisfying in ordinary philosophy, and since they cannot find any other truth, they take refuge in skepticism.”
Not only was Descartes familiar with some of the skeptical literature, but he also had a deep awareness of the Pyrrhonist crisis as a current issue. As mentioned above, he examined Herbert’s writings. In addition, in the autobiographical parts of the “Discourse on Method” and in his letters, we find evidence that around 1628 or 1629 Descartes was acutely aware of the need for a new and powerful response to the attacks being made by the full force of skepticism. This awakening to the threat of skepticism led Descartes, while in Paris, to launch his philosophical revolution in an attempt to discover something so solid and certain that it could not be shaken by any of the extravagant assumptions of the skeptics.
Descartes left Paris. In order to find a solution to the Pyrrhonist crisis, he sought a new truth and reflected on it in his hiding place in Holland. His interest shifted from science and mathematics to theological metaphysics in order to discover the immovable foundation of human cognition.
The onslaught of the Reformation, the Scientific Revolution and skepticism had destroyed all the old foundations of human intellectual achievement that he had previously supported. The new age demanded a new basis to justify and guarantee what they had discovered. Descartes, standing in the tradition of the greatest medieval minds, sought to provide this foundation by combining the foundation of an omnipotent God with the superstructure of human natural cognition. Here we see Descartes’ sense of mission as a man chosen by God.

A Mysterious Experience in the Furnace Room

According to the biographer of Descartes, A. Baillet (1649-1706), in a now-lost manuscript by Descartes, he wrote, “On November 10, 1619, inspired, I was discovering the foundations of a remarkable science…” There is no doubt that this was a phrase commemorating “A Day of Contemplation in the Furnace Room”. On this night, Descartes had three dreams. In these dreams, Descartes felt that the spirit of truth had been sent by God, and he believed that God had given him the vocation to renew the entire philosophy by himself. He considered this to be the most important event of his life, and, filled with the emotion that his future work had been blessed by God, he made a vow to make a pilgrimage to the Basilica of Our Lady of Loreto on his way to Italy, where he was planning to go. These events are recorded in A. Baillet’s “Life of Descartes” (1691), and as far as we can believe his testimony, it seems that this was an event that determined Descartes’ ideological life from then on.

Awareness of “I”

At the beginning of the second part of “A Discourse of a Method”, he reports in a calm tone what he thought about in the furnace room in Ulm. There is not a single mention of dreams. What is discussed there is firstly that “in a work composed of many parts and made by the hands of various craftsmen, there is no such perfection as in a work finished by a single person”. A building designed and completed by a single architect is usually far more beautiful and orderly than one that has been repaired by many people using old walls that were built for other purposes. Old cities that were once small villages but have grown over time into large towns are usually less well-balanced than regular towns designed and built by a single engineer in the middle of a plain. The same is true of the laws of a country. When a single legislator, such as Lycurgus of ancient Sparta (who lived between the 11th and 8th centuries BC), sets out a policy and makes laws on his own, it results in something that is well-organized and consistent with a single purpose. The same is true of learning: a scholastic discipline that has no basis in evidence and no logical arguments, and which has been gradually constructed and expanded by many different people, cannot be as close to the truth as the simple reasoning that a single sensible person can do with his or her natural abilities when it comes to matters that appear before him or her. In other words, he is arguing that only a system of knowledge that has been derived by a single person using the correct method can be called true learning.

Awakening to Philosophy

When he left the furnace room of a small village near Ulm, Descartes became a philosopher. Before that, he was a natural philosopher. He was just a natural inquirer who was interested in individual applied technical research.

After being awakened to theoretical research through his encounter with Isaac Beeckman (1588-1677), Descartes gradually began to devote himself to research that treated physics mathematically. What is even more remarkable is that in a letter to Beeckman dated March 4, 1619, he mentions the problem of method and expresses the idea of generalizing these methods. He says that if mathematics is universalized in this way, a completely new discipline should be born, and that according to this, one should be able to solve all the problems presented, whether they are of a continuous or discontinuous nature.

Here, Descartes is aiming for something more than just mathematics. He is moving towards a new method of thought. It is not just a matter of applying algebraic methods to geometry. In his book ‘Rules for the Direction of the Mind’, Descartes says, “The name ‘mathematics(mathesis)’ originally meant just the same as ‘study’, so in that respect all studies would be called mathematics with the same rights as geometry itself.” In other words, he thought that astronomy, music, optics, mechanics and many other things could be described using mathematics. Descartes gradually approached the idea of universal mathematics (Mathesis Universalis). However, such a universal discipline would never be completed by a single person. In the same letter (the letter to Bekman dated March 26), he also wrote, “This is an infinite task, and it is impossible for a single person to accomplish it. It is also an incredibly ambitious task that is hard to believe.”

Here, he is still speaking as a natural scientist. Given the nature of the study of natural science, it is not something that can be completed by a single person in a single stroke. The mysteries of nature are only revealed through the continuation of research by the cooperation of almost an infinite number of people, with the achievements of previous generations being passed on and inherited from one era to the next. However, from the day of his divine revelation on November 10th 1619, Descartes resolutely turned away from the path of the communal nature of natural science. He then decided to build his studies on a completely new foundation, relying solely on his own strength. How did this sudden transformation come about? Why did Descartes abandon the path of the scientist to become a philosopher? This is a truly interesting question.

Walking alone in the darkness

On November 10th, 1619, it was a fateful day. He was deep in thought in the furnace room of a small village near Ulm. When he left there, he was a philosopher. Or to be more precise, he had begun his journey to becoming a philosopher. “I will proceed as if walking alone in the darkness. I have decided to pay the closest attention to everything. …” (Discourse on the Method, Part II) However, it was a steady, unerring step, one step at a time. While walking carefully and cautiously through the darkness, he gradually pushes back the darkness and tries to make the light appear from far away. What is he searching for? It is the mystery of the world (the universe). The outline of the chaotic world gradually becomes clear. Within the jumble of things that have no definite shape, a clear shape and order can be seen. He is searching for that order. He is searching for the world’s order, its orderly structure. He is trying to gradually bring to light the rationally ordered form of the world, following a method. In a nutshell, it is the path from “chaos to cosmos”. It is a path that leads from contemplation in the furnace room to “Cogito, ergo sum” through a journey around the world.

Universal Wisdom

What the philosopher Descartes is searching for is a holistic image of the world. A systematized and ordered view of the world, in other words, a “world (cosmology) theory”. However, this cannot be captured through the collaborative work of many natural scientists. Natural scientists can precisely elucidate parts of the world from a specific angle, but they cannot capture these parts in relation to the whole. No matter how skillfully the partial world views of each scientist are combined and organized, it is impossible to grasp a truly unified, holistic view of the world. The arithmetic sum of the parts is by no means a living whole. In this sense, the task of a single philosopher is similar to that of a single engineer, who designs and builds an ideal city with a well-ordered structure in a wilderness with no buildings. A sensible philosopher, that is, Descartes, would realize a new system of learning, or universal wisdom, by guiding reason in an orderly fashion according to the most universal method and expanding the field of knowledge as much as possible. That was what he aimed to achieve.

“All things that are potentially within the range of human cognition are connected in the same way. We must be careful not to accept as true that which is not true. In this way, when we reason from one thing to another, if we follow the necessary order, we will eventually reach even those things that are far apart. We will also eventually discover those things that are cleverly hidden.”

(From the second part of “Discourse on the Method”)

Here, the Cartesian ideal of method is clearly expressed. He is considering the most universal method that would lead to all objects that are cognizable by humans in the same way. The scholastic scholars were fundamentally mistaken in believing that “different disciplines should be distinguished from each other by the difference of their objects, and studied separately and independently of all others.” For “every discipline is human wisdom. It must always retain its identity, no matter how it is applied to different subjects. Just as the light of the sun shines on everything without discrimination, we must treat all matters without discrimination.”

(From ‘Rules for the Direction of the Mind,’ 1)

The idea of the differentiation and specialization of modern science was completely foreign to Descartes. He sought to place all possible objects within a homogeneous and continuous order of cognition.

The autobiographical section of the Discourse on the Method shows that Descartes began his philosophical revolution in 1628 or 1629. This revolution was begun by applying his method of systematic doubt to the whole mechanism of human cognition in order to discover a sure foundation for human knowledge. In the Discourse on the Method, the Meditations on First Philosophy and the Search for Truth by Natural Light, he set out a procedure for advancing skepticism that was more powerful than anything developed by the Pyrrhonists of ancient times or of his own day. It began with the following rule

“I shall not accept anything as true without having clearly recognized it as such. In other words, I shall carefully avoid hasty judgments and prejudices, and shall not include in my judgment anything other than what appears to my mind with such clarity and certainty that I have no reason to doubt it.”

Descartes tried to clearly define the limits beyond which the temptation to doubt could not arise. This rule itself is very similar to one previously proposed in Pierre Charron’s (1541-1603) book “La Sagesse” (Wisdom). Applying these ideas, Descartes showed that the depth of his skepticism went far beyond the simple and mild stages introduced by previous skeptics.

The first two stages merely raise standard reasons for skepticism. The first stage of skepticism shows that there are several grounds for questioning the reliability or sincerity of our everyday sensory experience. The second stage of skepticism creates within itself the inducement to doubt the reality of the world we perceive, in that there is the possibility that our entire experience is part of a dream. Based on these two stages, the standard arguments for skepticism fully illustrate the possibility that our ordinary beliefs about everyday experience are doubtful or false.

Furthermore, the demon hypothesis, which is the next stage, is very effective in expressing the uncertainty of what we think we perceive. This possibility reveals the full extent of skepticism in the most obvious way, and exposes the foundations of skepticism that no one has touched on before. If there are evil spirits that can distort the information we have or our ability to evaluate and test the information we possess, then what should we do?

If the criteria or labels we use to recognize things are potentially contaminated by evil spirits, then no matter how we examine the reliability of what we perceive, there will still be room for doubt.

Descartes thoroughly considered the possibility of skepticism leading to the most fundamental and thorough devastation. This is because the information we have is not only deceptive, illusory and misleading, but there is also the possibility that our ability to verify it may be wrong, even under the best of circumstances. Descartes realized that unless we can raise the heat of skepticism to this highest level and then overcome it, nothing can be certain. Because there is always a persistent doubt that contaminates everything we perceive and makes everything uncertain in some way.

Descartes clearly understood the overwhelming importance of this demon belief, or skepticism, about our ability to test. There is the fact that our senses sometimes make mistakes, and the fact that our reason sometimes produces illogical conclusions. Descartes also rejected everything he had previously accepted, on the basis of the fact that anyone else could easily fall into the same kind of error.

In his Meditations on First Philosophy, Descartes pointed out that it is possible for me to be mistaken every time I add 2 and 3 together (in mathematics), every time I count the sides of a square (in geometry), or every time I judge something if I can imagine something easier. The possibility that we are constantly being deceived by some evil power calls into question even the most obvious things and the most obvious criteria.
Descartes arrived at the highest point of skepticism. When it is proposed that even the reliability of our most rational faculties can be called into question, then man is transformed from a repository of truth into a den of uncertainty and error.
We can only overcome the power of skepticism when it is pushed to its ultimate situation, and a Pyrrhonist crisis even deeper than that which the “new Pyrrhonists” once dreamed of arises. Unless we pursue the possibility of skepticism to its ultimate conclusion, we will never have any hope of discovering a truth that is not tainted by skepticism or uncertainty. By transforming ordinary skepticism into a thorough denial, Descartes laid the groundwork for the unparalleled and overwhelming power of cogito. Therefore, by recognizing the certainty of cogito, it becomes impossible to oppose it by any willful action.
Skeptics did not believe that we humans possessed any kind of truth. On the other hand, Descartes was convinced that we humans do possess truth, but we just can’t see it. He said that these preconceptions and beliefs that blind us can be removed by doubting and denying, and then the truth will shine forth. The ultimate goal for Descartes was to create a standard for the cognition of completely certain truth. The skeptical method of searching for this goal is to apply skepticism to everything we perceive. By daring to jump into this “swamp of uncertainty” of skepticism, Descartes finds a solution in “cogito”, and skepticism is thoroughly defeated. In the “Discourse on the Method”, Descartes said

“While I was trying to think that everything was false, I realized that I, who was thinking that, must necessarily be something. And I recognized that this truth, “I think, therefore I am” (Latin: Cogito ergo sum, English: I think, therefore I am), is so solidly certain that it cannot be shaken by any extravagant assumptions of the skeptic. I judged that this truth could be the “first principle of philosophy” that I was seeking.

Cogito functions as the conclusion of skepticism. By taking skepticism to its extreme, we come face to face with a truth that cannot be doubted in any way. In other words, cogito is the essence of thinking. The process of doubting forces a person to recognize what they themselves are aware of, and also forces them to know that they are doubting, thinking, and existing here. The discovery of true knowledge is not miraculous, nor is it a special action of divine grace. The discovery of the absolutely certain single truth of cogito may overthrow the skeptical attitude that everything is uncertain. However, this single truth does not constitute a system of cognition about existence. The experience of being confronted with cogito is a firm and solid starting point, and a series of bridges must be built between cogito and the discovery or justification of our perception of the nature of things. The first step in this is to establish a clear and intelligible principle that will lead us from our intellectual truth to the truth about reality. This is to give us the first bridge from the subjective cognition of a truth about our ideas to the cognition of reality.

Descartes’ Metaphysics

For our existence and cognition, there must be a God on whom we are wholly dependent. However, it is God’s responsibility to justify this. With this concept of God, based on a clear and distinct idea of God, Descartes was now ready to march triumphantly into his promised land, the new world of categoricalism, where recognition of truth and reality was guaranteed to be complete.
God is my creator, and he cannot deceive. I have been created with the ability to judge that whatever I clearly and distinctly perceive is true, so my ability to judge is guaranteed by God. Not only must I believe that whatever I clearly and distinctly perceive is true, but by God’s grace it actually is true. With this tremendous guarantee, Descartes was able to dissipate the skepticism of his Meditations on First Philosophy.
Since evil spirits have been driven out of heaven and earth, there is no question about the truth of mathematics, and mathematical truths are clear and distinct. We are forced to believe them, and God is not a deceiver. Therefore, we can be at ease in this compulsion. Our connection with the truth of nature is also discovered through our trust in God. We can be confident that there is in fact a natural world that corresponds to the true nature of the objects of pure extension that arise from our ideas. This is because God would not have made us think in this way if such a world that transcends the scope of our ideas did not in fact exist.

Regarding atheists

Atheists cannot have this assurance of the objective truth of clear and distinct ideas, because they have no God to assure them of what they think they perceive. In response to Mersenne’s claim that atheists can also perceive mathematical truths as clear and distinct, Descartes said the following

“I do not deny that, but I only maintain that the atheist does not acknowledge it by true and certain knowledge, because every possible doubt ought not to be called knowledge. Perhaps such a doubt does not occur to him. But if he examines it, or if it is pointed out to him by others, he will still be aware of the doubt. Therefore, unless he first recognizes God, he will never be free from the danger of harboring such doubts.”

Therefore, the atheist, no matter what truths he knows, can never be thoroughly convinced that they are true, because no matter how convinced he is, he can never completely rule out the possibility that he is being deceived. There is no worldly guarantee or basis for certainty. In the secular world, even in the most obvious matters, there is always the possibility of deception by evil spirits or self-deception. Thus, in a world separated from God, any truth can be considered doubtful. And no true and certain knowledge will be discovered. Only God can eliminate all skepticism when we recognize that He is not a deceiver. Therefore, only God can guarantee that the truth we recognize in mathematics and the natural sciences is more than just a similarity to the truth within our spirit.

My opinion

Descartes aimed to be freed from the Pyrrhonist crisis. It was a request from the almighty God. Someone had to accomplish it, but I don’t think God is waiting with equal opportunities for everyone. He designates people. Descartes was chosen. He expressed this in his writings and letters.

What does God want from human beings? I think it is to exist forever as the manager of the created world. Then, why do you say that? If you think about how God created the world, you will come to that conclusion. I think that the liberation from the crisis of skepticism was also an important element for the human world to continue forever.

Now, what does skepticism mean? I think it is a state of unreliability in which the truth is coherent and the general gist is understood, but the categorical statements presented seem to have problems in relation to the real world and metaphysics. Or, to put it another way, you could say that doubting is a way of refining the truth.

Descartes was chosen by God to overcome the Pyrrhonist crisis. Descartes discovered “cogito”, which I think is the same as the “uniqueness” we know today. I think “cogito” is God’s approval. This is an idea that only Descartes, who was chosen by God, could come up with, and it may be difficult for others to understand. At the time, only Descartes himself would have understood this. However, Descartes needed to explain the importance of this to others so that they would understand. Cogito expresses “uniqueness” and does not oppose “diversity”. “Uniqueness” is the selectivity of human consciousness, and “diversity” and “uniqueness” can coexist without opposing each other. The authority to make choices was given to humans by God. Descartes succeeded in describing the process of discovering “uniqueness” in detail and philosophically.

The concept of harmony and unity is one in which the relationship between the internal elements is loose, but the match is ideal and there is no compromise at all, like a jigsaw puzzle. The concept of harmony and unity is one in which the relationship between the internal elements may collapse if the discipline is too strict. Match is a higher concept than harmony or unity. Even though it is difficult to achieve a perfect match in the real world, with no gaps, it can be said to be the ultimate ideal. Therefore, it is possible to coexist with diversity. There are two ways of thinking in human consciousness: one that accepts many opinions, such as “diversity”, and one that requires us to choose one. In some cases, the two concepts may be complexly combined.

Since the 17th century, the relationship between skepticism and categoricalism has gradually changed from a conflicting relationship to a relationship between two partners that can coexist, namely ‘diversity’ and ‘uniqueness’. The coexistence of ‘diversity’ and ‘uniqueness’ contributed to the scientific revolution that took place in the 17th century and beyond. I think that the “uniqueness” discovered by Descartes is a concept that played a part in this. “Cogito” is Descartes himself, chosen by God. Perhaps no one else could have discovered it. Descartes discovered it as a representative of humanity, chosen by God.

Humans must construct the universe in their minds. Academics are necessary for this purpose. The scientific revolution was a major catalyst for the evolution of traditional academics. Humans’ conception of the world must be aligned with the almighty God’s conception of the world. The real world seems to be more than just what can be seen, touched, and felt. We must go beyond the worldview of the human senses and search for and find things that are not easily accessible, and make them available to humans. The way we describe the world must change from confrontation to coexistence.

Descartes, misunderstood

When Descartes proudly demonstrated his method for vanquishing the evil dragon of skepticism, he immediately found himself accused of being a dangerous Pyrrhonist and of being a failed categoricalist whose theory was nothing more than fantasy and illusion. The orthodox and traditional thinkers saw Descartes as a malicious skeptic. This is because his method of skepticism rejects the very foundations of traditional systems of thought. Therefore, no matter what Descartes himself tried to explain, he was seen as the culmination of a 2000-year history of Pyrrhonists, which began with Pyrrho of Elis. On the other hand, those with a skeptical bent, although reluctantly and grudgingly, recognized Descartes as one of their own, and tried to show that he had achieved nothing and that everything he claimed was nothing more than a conjecture without certainty. The categoricalists also strongly attacked the Meditations on First Philosophy.
Even after Descartes, modern philosophy had to take into account the Pyrrhonist crisis. If someone tried to ignore it, all their basic assumptions and all their conclusions would be open to doubt and they might be attacked by some new Pyrrhonist.

My opinion

Descartes published his philosophy, but it seems that he was misunderstood and attacked. Perhaps Descartes did not explain something clearly enough when he published his work. I think that he was assuming the idea of diversity in order to discover cogito. I think that this was not explained clearly enough. Perhaps this is why he was misunderstood. From our perspective today, it’s something that’s easy to understand, but people at the time may not have understood the premise of the story.

Continued in the rebirth of Cartesian philosophy 4